Higher Tarifs, Lower Revenues? Analyzing the Fiscal Aspects of "The Great TariJf Debate of 1888" DOUGLAS A. IRWIN After the Civil War, Congress maintained high import tariffs to pay off the public debt. By the early 1 880s the federal government was running large fiscal surpluses -revenues exceeded expenditures by over 40 percent. The Democrats proposed lower tariffs to reduce customs revenue. The Republicans proposed higher tariffs to reduce imports and customs revenues. This article attempts to determine the revenue effects of the proposed changes. Given the height of the tariff and the price elasticity of U.S. import demand, the actual tariff was below the maximum revenue rate, and therefore a tariff reduction would have reduced customs revenue.
In the late nineteenth century, U.S. import tariffs served two purposes: they raised fiscal revenue and they protected certain domestic producers from foreign competition. To help collect sufficient revenue to pay off the enormous debt incurred as a result of the Civil War, Congress kept tariffs high (relative to prewar rates) after the war. By the early 1 880s, however, a curious problem had arisen-the federal government was running large and seemingly intractable fiscal surpluses.
The two main political parties agreed that a significant reduction of the budget surplus was an urgent priority. The Republicans and the Democrats also agreed that a large expansion in government expenditures was undesirable. The parties strongly disagreed, however, on tax policy (that is, tariff policy), and this disagreement set the stage for what became known as "the Great Tariff Debate of 1888."
Fashioning themselves as "tariff reformers," the Democrats proposed reductions in import duties. They believed that this would reduce government revenue, ease the tax burden on consumers and farmers, and eliminate inequities associated with special interest protection. The Republicans, by contrast, argued that any tariff reduction would stimulate imports and raise even more revenue. Furthermore, they contended, lower tariffs would expose American industry and workers to foreign competition and thereby jeopardize the economic well-being of the country. The Republicans proposed higher tariffs to achieve the dual objectives of reducing government revenue and protecting American industry from import competition.
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The "Great Tariff Debate" thus concerned both the revenue effects of tariffs and the broader issue of free trade and protection. This article focuses exclusively on the fiscal aspects of this controversy. In principle, either the Democratic or the Republican view on the revenue effects of tariff changes could have been correct-depending upon how much import demand responded to lower or higher tariffs, either more or less government revenue could be raised than before the change. The aim of this article is to understand the revenue effects of tariffs more thoroughly and determine which view was more accurate.
IHE FISCAL SURPLUS AND "THE GREAT TARIFF DEBATE OF 1888"
A Republican Congress enacted the Morrill tariff of 1861, which sharply raised import duties, just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. To help finance war-related expenditures, Congress repeatedly raised import duties during the early 1860s.' The large public debt left to be serviced in the war's aftermath left little room for a postwar tariff reduction. Tariffs were the single most important source of government revenue in the decades after the war, raising just over half of all revenue. In the late 1860s and through the 1870s, high tariff rates enabled the government to run a fiscal surplus and reduce the debt.
By the early 1880s, however, the fiscal surpluses of the federal government began to swell to unprecedented proportions. During the years 1880 through 1888, revenues exceeded expenditures by a sizeable 40 percent, on average. In fiscal year 1888, for example, the federal government ran a budget surplus of $111.3 million, which amounted to 41.6 percent that year's $267.9 million in expenditures-including not only debt service but the sinking fund.2 John James notes that although "callable debt was completely retired by 1887" the government "continued to pay off debt by purchasing noncallable debt in the open market, having had to pay premiums as high as 29 percent above par."3 As a result, the debt to GNP ratio fell sharply, from 31 percent in 1869 to 19 percent in 1880 and to 11 percent in 1888.4
The large fiscal surpluses were perceived as a major economic problem for the government. Some in Congress forecast that the entire national debt would soon be eliminated and worried that, unless something changed, the treasury would continue to accumulate assets. They feared that this would drain the economy of liquidity and have adverse repercussions on the 'See Richardson, Greatest Nation, for a discussion of Republican tariff policies in the 1 860s. 2In fiscal years 1882 and 1883, revenues exceeded expenditures by over 50 percent. If it be the purpose of the majority to reduce the income of the Government from customs sources, we beg to remind them that that purpose will not be accomplished by the scaling down of duties, as proposed in the bill. It is well known and supported by almost universal experience that a mere diminution of duties tends to stimulate foreign importations and thereby increase the revenue.7
Using examples from the tariff reductions of 1883, they claimed to "demonstrate that a simple scaling down of duties from 20 to 30 or 40 percent, more or less, will only increase revenues and therefore augment the surplus." However, the Mills bill was "dead on arrival" in the Senate, which was controlled by the Republicans. They fashioned their own legislation, which
proposed to raise tariff rates instead. The Senate Finance Committee report (written by the majority) rejected the House bill in part because "[i]ts adoption would probably result in an increase, instead of a reduction, of the revenue from customs." "The House bill," they explained, "has been formulated on the theory that a diminution of revenues can only be secured by a reduction or repeal of protective duties, and that tariff revision means simply that indiscriminate cutting down of rates which encourages importations, benefits foreign manufacturers, and produces free trade." Finance Committee Republicans rejected this "theory" because "we are confident that the large reduction in rates proposed would result in greatly increased importations" and thereby increase rather than diminish customs revenue. Instead, they proposed reducing internal excise taxes (mainly on alcohol) and raising import duties, an approach that they believed would "reduce revenues and at the same time preserve the American system [of protection] ."9
The Senate bill, however, never came to a vote as Congress adjourned in the final weeks of the fall election campaign. The presidential election of 1888, in which the main issue was the tariff, decided the issue by giving the Republicans control of both chambers of Congress and the presidency. 10 The result was the McKinley tariff of 1890, which significantly scaled up tariff rates. According to the report of the House Ways -and Means Committee majority, the proposition that higher tariff rates would lead to a "substantial reduction" in customs revenue "admits of no doubt." As they explained, "it is not believed that the increase of duties upon wools and woolen goods, and upon glassware, will have the effect of increasing the revenues. . . . The result will be that importations will be decreased, and therefore the amount of revenue collected from these sources will be diminished." In fact, the Republicans were so bold as to predict that "[i]n every case of increased duty except that imposed upon tin plate ... and upon linen fabrics the effect will be to reduce rather than enlarge the revenues, because importations will
The minority Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee were incredulous: "A time when it is confessed by all parties that the Government does 8Quoted in Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, Vol. 2, p. 234.
9Quotes from U.S. Congress, Customs Tariffs, p. 91.
?0See Reitano, Tariff Question, for details on the role of the tariff in the election campaign.
Higher Tariffs, Lower Revenues? 63 not need additional revenue, but that there ought to be a reduction of its receipts, the bill reported by the majority proposes to levy upon a great many articles of absolute necessity higher rates of duty than were ever heretofore proposed in any measure reported to Congress." In fact, the Democrats "did not even make answer to the general proposition that the reductions in the rates of duty would result in an increase of importation and an augmentation rather than a diminution of the revenue," allowing the Republican position to go "unanswered.""2
These two opposing views of the revenue effects of tariff changes were stated not just in the committee reports, but frequently on the floor of the The revenue impact of taxes on labor income has received extensive discussion in the public finance literature. 14 The approach in this literature can easily be adapted to the case of import duties; whereas the revenuemaximizing tax on labor income hinges crucially on the elasticity of labor supply, the revenue-maximizing tariff hinges crucially on the elasticity of import demand.15
"Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, Vol. 2, p. 236.
13Smith, Wealth of Nations, V.ii.k.27.
"4See, for example, Blinder, "Thoughts"; Fullerton, "Possibility"; and Browning, "Elasticities."
'"The international trade literature on tariffs suggests that the maximum revenue tariff rate exceeds the optimal tariff rate, but has otherwise not devoted much attention to the revenue effects of tariffs.
James ("Optimal Tariff") has estimated the antebellum optimal tariff to be about 35 to 40 percent, but
Harley ("Antebellum American Tariff") strongly disputes this. The maximum revenue tariff calculated in this article is much higher than even James's estimate of the optimal tariff.
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The expression for g
where R is revenue, t is the average ad valorem tariff rate, p is the price of imports, and Mis the volume of imports. Totally differentiating this expression with respect to the tariff yields dR dM dp dR = PM + tp d + tMd Case 1-Fixed Import Prices
The revenue-maximizing tariff rate, t*, is found by setting dR /dt to zero.
Taking import prices as given (that is, dp /dt = 0), the revenue-maximizing tariff rate is 1 +1D
where ID iS the relative price elasticity of import demand. If import demand is inelastic (O > 'ID> -1), then the revenue-maximizing tariff is infinite. If import demand is elastic, the revenue-maximizing tariff can be quite large:
if 'ID = -2, then t* = 100 percent; if riD = -4, then t* = 33 percent. Clearly, the precise revenue-maximizing tariff rate is very sensitive to the underlying elasticity of import demand. Furthermore, the "Republican hypothesis"
cannot be easily ruled out: an import demand elasticity of -4 is plausible, and a tariff of 33 percent is not far from actual tariff rates in the late nineteenth century. Therefore, the existing tariff could have been beyond the revenue-maximizing rate.
A problem with this formula is that it assumes that the import demand where Es ( > 0) is the elasticity of foreign export sup of the elasticity of import demand, this equation implies a higher revenuemaximizing tariff rate than that in Case 1 because the higher tariff reduces import prices, meaning imports and revenue would be greater than would otherwise be the case. Taking TD = -2, for example, es = 3 implies t* = 166 percent; Es = 5 implies t* = 140 percent; Es = 7 implies t* = 128 percentas Es approaches infinity, t* approaches 100 percent, as in Case 1. If import demand is more elastic at rD = -4, then the respective revenue-maximizing tariffs are 77 percent, 60 percent, and 52 percent.
In this case, the elasticity of revenue with respect to the tariff rate can be tor.19 The point estimate of the relative price elasticity of import demand is about -2.6. This estimate is higher than the mean value of price elasticities found in postwar data, as reported by Marquez, but well within the range of those elasticities. In any event, it is important to examine the sensitivity of revenue to the particular import demand elasticity chosen.
No explicit assumption about the foreign export supply elasticity has been made in estimating this cointegrating vector. If foreign export supply is not perfectly elastic, then standard OLS estimates of import demand will gener-Irwin ate downward-biased estimates of the price a consistent estimation of the price elasticit into account all endogenous variation in the error term. This is one reason why this approach yields a larger price elasticity than comparable OLS estimates of import demand. Still, nothing is revealed about the precise value of the foreign export supply elasticity, which, as already noted, is also a key parameter.
EVALUATING THE REVENUE IMPACT OF LATE-NINETEENTH-CENTURY TARIFFS
With this estimate of the relative price elasticity of late-nineteenth U.S. import demand in hand, the fiscal implications of the propos changes can be evaluated. 'ID=-1.5 TID -2.6 'qD -3.7
Revenue-maximizing tariff rate Table also considers elasticity values plus-and-minus one standard error from the point estimate. If one is willing to consider import demand elasticities above -3.7, then the revenue maximizing tariff rate begins to approach 30 percent and the "Republican hypothesis" becomes more plausible.
The case for the "Republican hypothesis" becomes much less plausible, however, if foreign export supply is not perfectly elastic, as Case 2 of Table  2 demonstrates. Because estimating export supply elasticities is notoriously more difficult than estimating import demand elasticities, no attempt is made here to determine this parameter. However, with an export supply elasticity of 5 and an import demand elasticity of -2.6, the revenue-maximizing tariff jumps to nearly 100 percent. Even when import demand is highly price elastic, just adding some elasticity to foreign export supply brings the revenue-maximizing tariff well above the actual tariff in 1888. In this case, a tariff reduction would have reduced the customs revenue received by the government.
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Irwin Table 3 This provision, rather than higher tariff rates, accounts for most of the reduction in dutiable imports and customs revenue.
When sugar (including raw and processed sugar, molasses, and so on) is excluded from imports, the value of dutiable imports rose negligibly (0.8 percent, to $423.5 million) after the imnposition of the tariff, but revenue Each party stated that the degree of protection they offered was perfectly compatible with what both parties agreed was a desirable reduction in government revenues.
That there was no real conflict between trade policy and fiscal policy was made clear in the Republicans' creative McKinley tariff of 1890, which achieved both higher tariff rates and lower tariff revenues by raising protective duties and by setting some revenue duties to zero (moving sugar onto the duty-free list, for example). By the early 1890s, slower economic growth and greater public spending helped shift the government's fiscal position toward deficit and the "problem" of the fiscal surpluses was soon gone.
